As Finland requires a risk assessment for the Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant, the question of whether nuclear power can be used for geopolitical purposes is being re-examined.
The new Dutch government wanted to kick off its term in office when it announced that it would build two new nuclear reactors in what could be a radical departure from Amsterdam’s earlier nuclear skepticism. The move is intended to help the Netherlands reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030, with a broader view of achieving climate neutrality by 2060. By turning to the “taboo” topic of nuclear energy, the Dutch coalition is turning to floats against the current of (most) European politics, which is currently again criticizing nuclear power, starting with questions about its viability and its possible role in geopolitical maneuvers.
The latter question in particular comes from an unexpected direction – Finland – one of the most open pro-nuclear governments in the EU. In October, the country’s Ministry of Defense called for “a risk assessment for the controversial Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant”, citing economic and geopolitical risks arising from Rosatom’s involvement in the project. Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear supplier, is part of the Fennovoima consortium overseeing the construction of Hanhikivi.
“In light of recent geopolitical tensions, many Western countries view Russia and China with greater skepticism when it comes to the provision of major nuclear technologies,” said Rauli Partanen, energy analyst and author from Finland. Indeed, the dichotomy between OECD and non-OECD nuclear suppliers is becoming a growing issue in the energy sector, especially when state-backed companies from Russia or China are involved. It is often argued against the conclusion of nuclear technology and supply contracts with companies from such countries that this creates decades of dependencies between supplier and recipient, which could possibly expose them to political pressure.
Nevertheless, international experts agree that so far there is no clear evidence of such use of nuclear technology. For example, a 2020 report on the geopolitics of nuclear energy came to the conclusion that although nuclear energy exports establish long-term trade relationships, they hardly qualify as an effective instrument for leveraging foreign policy. This is due to the fact that this commitment is based on mutual trust and the ability of the supplier to deliver. Should a supplier violate this trust, the extensive damage to the industry’s reputation would be so great that it could undermine an entire country’s export strategy.
This means that the risk is at best very low – not least because it should come as no surprise that avoiding such reputational damage is a priority for nuclear technology exporting countries, which in itself serves to minimize the risk of inadequate geopolitical leverage. Otherwise, countries like Russia would “severely disadvantage its own industry, credibility and reputation” in the future. Expert Partanen adds that most of the risk is inherent in delivery if the facility is to be operated by domestic actors, and points out that “large and long-term projects and collaborations also help mitigate certain risks through mutually beneficial activities to reduce”. help offset some of the perceived risks.
The Finnish Ministry of Defense pointed out in its appraisal that Russia, as the supplier of Hanhikivi 1’s nuclear fuel, poses a particular risk to energy security, although the supply of nuclear fuel is not subject to the same rigidity as that of other fuel sources, such as gas. A look at the Ukraine makes this clear. As Partanen noted, “despite the tension between the two countries, Ukraine’s nuclear power plants continued to get fuel from Russia” and “Ukraine has now arranged to have its fuel supplied elsewhere”.
In a broader sense, the geopolitical debate has the unfortunate effect of obscuring the broader benefits of new nuclear construction in a given country. This starts with reducing external dependencies on fossil fuels – a big step towards energy security and resilience – and ends with building up industrial know-how regardless of the nationality of the provider: “Nuclear know-how offers much more than just energy “, Explains Partanen,” such as nuclear medicine and isotopes, irradiation of food for better shelf life and many industrial innovations “with considerable spillover effects on other industries and sectors.
This has several long-term implications. If the fight against climate change is a priority, nuclear energy must be part of the solution. Both the Dutch and the Poles seem to have recognized this. But surprisingly, even the German public has begun to change its mind about nuclear energy, albeit slowly. According to a survey by the opinion research institute Civey on October 15, around 60% of those questioned answered positively to the question “Should Germany rely more on nuclear power again in order to successfully shape the energy transition” (“definitely yes” and “more or less yes”).
Such results indicate a growing dichotomy between political and popular attitudes toward nuclear technology, in contrast to the rhetoric of some activists that the world has largely left nuclear technology behind. Partanen observes: “Many more countries are considering a nuclear entry than an exit”, which will only contribute to the diversification of the nuclear market: services and know-how in the newcomer countries. “
There is clearly a need for Europe to be on the nuclear agenda. The European nuclear industry has suffered from lackluster support for years, which has only served to increase the concentration of nuclear export activities in the US, Russia and China. According to the latest study by the London-based think tank New Nuclear Watch Institute, this should not be viewed as a deliberate geopolitical, anti-competitive ploy, but rather as “the predictable development of a high-priced, high-fixed-cost industry in which repeatable,” reliable distribution is a key driver of the industrial competitiveness. “
Finland is now considering making the approval of Hanhikivi dependent on the outcome of the risk assessment. In view of the current climate constraints, Helsinki would be well advised to issue the building permit sooner rather than later.
Photo credit: Fennovoima / Wikimedia Commons. Used under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license.
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