How Did Negotiations to Persuade Ukraine to Give Up Soviet Nuclear Weapons On Its Soil Succeeded?

This paper draws on primary and scholarly sources from the soviet era which convinced the Ukrainian leadership to give up their nuclear arsenal which they inherited from the Soviet Union, after its dissolution. The Soviet nuclear arsenal was scattered around its territories in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. That arsenal poses an immediate threat to Europe and the US as well as chances were that the arsenal may get into the hands of non-state actors. The role of various parties including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the newly independent Ukraine. Ukraine is an important country in nuclear history, as it was home to the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl Ukraine, which blew up in 1984, marking the first major disaster in nuclear history. Ukraine was home to soviet nuclear missiles and submarines and possessed thousands of nuclear weapons when the USSR broke up.

1. Nuclear Disarmament or Denuclearization?

Global Zero is a buzzword used by the Nuclear Disarmament camp, who seek to dismantle all the nuclear weapons on earth, leading to a nuclear-free world.[1] While the term denuclearization can be applied to specific cases, where existing nuclear frameworks enabled by great powers bargain and persuade through negotiations to convince nuclear weapons states to willingly dismantle its nuclear weapons or nuclear energy program. There have been four successful denuclearization cases so far, which include South Africa, Belarus Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; the latter three were part of the Soviet Union.[2] After the debut of the nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in an intense nuclear arms buildup or nuclear arms. as there was no testing regime in place, both countries took to air-sea and land to test the yield of their nuclear devices, apart from that they developed sophisticated delivery means to deliver that payload, this non-stop nuclear development led to the formulation of some deadly nuclear warfighting strategies, which had the potential to destroy the world for multiple times. This realization that nuclear genie may get out of control and there may not be a reverse course once the missile starts flying towards each other territory, various nuclear arms control initiatives were perceived and adopted through intense negotiations over the years.[3] A series of bilateral treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, which started from the multilateral, seabed arms control treaty signed in 1971.[4] The nuclear arms control was mainly bilateral throughout the cold war, due to the largeness of the nuclear arsenals of both the US and USSR, having thousands of nuclear weapons. These arms control treaties helped develop a framework that can be employed in future instances to achieve any intended denuclearization, Strategic arms limitation treaty SALT, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, Intermediate nuclear forces treaty, INF, and others laid the foundations of modem inspection and verification regimes.[5] The Ukraine nuclear weapons were successfully and safely acquired and dismantled because of these decades-old arms control practices, practiced both by the Soviets and the Americans, to maintain parity through confidence-building measures and limited nuclear arsenal and their delivery modes for the greater good of humanity.

2. Soviet Nuclear arsenal in the ex-Soviet territories

When the Soviet Union broke up, few of its territories were left with its nuclear arms arsenal and space capabilities, those territories include Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, all these territories occupied a strategic location and the rationale for placing or basing these weapons over there was a strategic necessity for the soviet leadership. At the time of the USSR’s dissolution, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had over 3000 nuclear weapons combined which contained both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.[6] The emergence of three new nuclear weapons states from the Soviet Union was a nightmare scenario for the United States, as these strategic weapons were available to new leadership, these newly created countries had financial woes, and these circumstances made it clear that leadership or any government official may sale parts of these weapons, as mafias in those regions were well aware of the loose nuclear arsenals and they were actively engaged in acquiring those weapons. The Lisbon Protocol in 1991, agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union and engaging Belarus Kazakhstan and Ukraine, put a lid on the nuclear danger in ex-Soviet territories.[7]

3. Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal at the time of USSR dissolution

Ukraine inherited over 1800 nuclear warheads making it the third-largest nuclear weapon state soon after it gained independence from the USSR.[8] Apart from the payload of such magnitude, Ukraine also inherited Soviet delivery systems, which was enough to carry nuclear strikes in any part of the world, those delivery systems include, 130 SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 46 newer SS-24 ICBMs and 40 strategic nuclear bombers and total of 200 strategic delivery systems.[9] The long negotiation process which was started mainly by the United States to secure these loose scattered around ex-Soviet territories took four years to complete. The Ukraine Denuclearization process was mainly achieved under the US-Russia bilateral treaty framework, known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I, the treaty achieved a full denuclearization of Ukraine, by ensuring blanket support by the United States, Russia, and Great Britain in the form of Budapest Memorandum which was signed in 1994.[10]

4. Path To Negotiations That Ended The Nuclear Footprints On Ukrainian Territory.

Denuclearization is a lengthy process which needs skill in every domain of the statecraft, the denuclearization of Ukraine took 6 long years, with a lot of negotiations, mediation and one to one bilateral meetings or phone conversations of the leaders at that time to successfully achieve denuclearization. In 1994 due to intense pressure from both the United States and Russia Ukraine surrendered its Nuclear Weapons, under the Massandra proposal.[11] The United States leadership was crucial in achieving this denuclearization, President Bush in a meeting with Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravuchk in the Mariinsky Palace Kiev, reiterated the economic support for Ukraine and linked economic issue with nuclear safety, he said to Urkainain Chairman that, “In the meantime, we can go forward with economic issues and the nuclear issue.”[12] Another conversation reveals the delayed or prolonged Ukrainian strategy to give up nuclear weapons, and its new nuclear command and control system, in a Memorandum from Philip Zelikow to Graham Allison, Robert Blackwill, Al Carnesale, Ash Carter, and Bill Hogan, “Harvard Discussion with Kravchuk on Nuclear Weapons.” September 30, 1991.[13] Kravchuk said that “Ukrainian denuclearization will take a countless number of years and he wants to maintain the central control of the nuclear weapons” when asked about the urgency of denuclearization to achieve the fastest possible denuclearization, he laid out a detailed framework for it involving many factors, including the development of the newly founded ministry of defense. A delegation of the four senators visited Russia and Ukraine, in 1992, the delegation also included two stalwarts senator who later launched Global Zero campaign, Senator Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, along with two other senators, the senators highlighted the state of fissile material and especially the fate of tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, the trip report state that, “tactical nuclear weapons are the most widely dispersed, easily moved and least securely controlled of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons” the senators called for the removal of those weapons as it will sufficiently lessen the nuclear danger looming over the Soviet republics and the world.[14] Ukraine always remained skeptical of the CIS the commonwealth of independent states, created by Russia, according to Ukrainian’s stance the CIS serves as a tool to control the ex-Soviet republics so that they can put under the Russian sphere of influence even after gaining independence from Russia. But due to massive economic and energy dependence on Russian gas and oil, Ukraine rethink its resistance to the idea of CIS, and later joined, CIS membership does have some positive effects on the Ukrainian newly found independence, its economy, and the armed forces. An Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine about Cooperation in the Development, Serial Production and Operation of Missiles, Missile Launchers and Space Vehicles was signed by Russian President Boris Yelstin and Ukraine’s President Kravchuk, on May 21st, 1992.[15] The agreement was an indeed a concrete step towards ensuring the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty and the offer from Russia means that Ukraine can now think about existing along the Russian border, this agreement played a crucial role in the national security psyche of Ukraine, and their decision about complete denuclearization. There are hundreds of meetings and conversations between the three parties, Ukraine Russia and the United States leadership were in regular contact to find solutions to the nuclear arsenal scattered around ex-Soviet territories. Few of those historical documents are of immense importance in nuclear history, as they played an important role in convincing Ukraine’s leadership to use this nuclear surrender as an opportunity to win the trust of Europeans and Americans. The nuclear non-proliferation was high on agenda in Europe as well as the United States, because of the security environment in that era, multiple countries including Iraq were trying to get their hands on nuclear weapons, the collapse of USSR and the loose nukes poses an immense danger to the American and allied security. Russia does have some security concerns but they were mainly moved by the fact that their newly founded neighbors are left with the nuclear deterrent, knowing the potential of the Ukrainian nuclear industry. Russia was hell-bent to secure those weapons and remove any security dilemma in the future. Russia also wanted to have cordial relations with the Americans after the fall, and Europeans and Americans too were supportive of the entente with the newly founded Russian Federation to remove any tensions in Europe. After the disintegration, United States was faced with a dilemma to deal with four nuclear weapons states around Europe, the newly created republics had massive nuclear arsenals, to convert those four nuclear powers into one, the United States and Russia worked towards securing those loose arsenals of the ex-Soviet States under the framework of START I treaty. Removing nuclear weapons from Ukraine under the START treaty became a matter of sovereignty for the Ukrainian leadership, but American pressure proved vital and the Ukrainians agreed to total denuclearization under the START I treaty.[16]

After taking the Presidency in the year 1993, President Clinton continued the policy of denuclearization under treaty obligations. He was instrumental in garnering a close working relationship with Boris Yeltsin. His relationship with Yelstin helped in depoliticizing the denuclearization process which was a great success for the United States. A telephonic conversation between President Bill Clinton and Ukrainian President Kravchuk on 6 January 1993 was an important step as Ukraine’s President agreed to the commitment of complete denuclearization, and said that we are well aware of our commitment before our people and the whole world.[17] The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was also an important tool in the post cold war world, to keep a check on the loose or rapidly growing arsenals in Europe, to avert any danger of large scale attack and major conflict in Europe. Ukraine became part of the CFE treaty, the treaty came into effect in 1992. The flank issues continued to resurface and on January 1st, 1996, according to the US Presidential Statements report, the Ukrainian President Kuchma announced the complete denuclearization of Ukraine, the trilateral statement was signed on January 14, 1994, to transfer all Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia for the dismantlement.[18] The trilateral statement also committed 175 million USD aid under Nunn Lugar aid to Ukraine, for the cooperative threat reduction. Russia later dismantled all the nuclear warheads and sent compensation in the form of fuel rods for the Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

5. Political and Military fallout of the Denuclearization

Many nuclear experts believed that it was the wrong and hurried decision of the immature leadership to let go of a precious deterrent. The United States pressure as it emerged as a sole superpower after the cold war and the Ukrainian crippled economy led to the denuclearization of Ukraine. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian forces, experts evaluated the possible effect of nuclear deterrence in the current scenario.[19] Crimea was an important case even in the denuclearization years as well, when Ukraine and Russia locked horns over the division of Black Sea Fleet and the port of Sevastopol control. Russia never wanted to completely vacate the strategic place like Crimea, and they somehow managed to retain control of the area, which was later annexed by Russia in 2014. The Political fallout can still be seen in Ukraine, a country which holds immense potential in military weapons manufacturing and export, and a history of operating nuclear power plants, fissile material and have decades of expertise in a nuclear command control framework, the country failed to halt the annexation of Crimea, in the face of larger Russian military threat. The military aspect is also disturbing, Ukraine since independence adopted a fine line between the West and Russia, but it was more in the European camp, due to its experiments with democracy and distaste for the Russian interference in their political and military matters. A nuclear deterrent could have sound implications on the strategic environment around Ukraine, Russia could have avoided open meddling in their state affairs, annexing their territories, and launching guerilla movement into an eastern Ukrainian territory of Donbas.[20] The nuclear deterrence equation proved vital in regional and international conflicts, and these weapons proved to be vital in eliminating the threat of total war in many regions including Asia, where a range of territorial disputes result in regular skirmishes on the borders, but never really transformed into an all-out war between the nuclear adversaries.

6. Conclusion

The negotiations process that led to the denuclearization of Ukraine was a trilateral process, in which two major powers were dealing directly with Ukraine. Ukraine’s political setup was fragile and the economic situation extremely volatile, while the United States emerges as a sole superpower ushering a new era of unipolar, Russia being down but not out holds considerable influence over the detached territories including Ukraine. The official documents, reports, conversations, and meetings offer a first-hand source to piece together a puzzle of Ukraine’s denuclearization. Ukraine’s denuclearization is an important step in nuclear history and a valid example for the modern-day statesman, to pursue policies about denuclearization in many parts of the world to make it less dangerous.

[1] Author Thomas C. Schelling, “A World without Nuclear Weapons?,” American Academy of Arts & Sciences, accessed August 6, 2020, https://www.amacad.org/publication/world-without-nuclear-weapons.

[2] “Arms Control Today,” Lessons Learned From Denuclearizing States | Arms Control Association, accessed August 6, 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/features/lessons-learned-denuclearizing-states.

[3] “Catalogue,” A strategic framework for missile defence / Ron Huisken | National Library of Australia, accessed August 6, 2020, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1647646.

[4] U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed August 6, 2020, https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/arms/treaties/seabed1.html.

[5] “Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament Verification – Sipri.org,” accessed August 6, 2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipriinsight1904_0.pdf.

[6] “Denuclearization And Ukraine: Lessons for the Future,” Taylor & Francis, accessed August 6, 2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700408436959.

[7] “The Denuclearization of Ukraine – JSTOR,” accessed August 6, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41036694.

[8] 7 ibid

[9] 7 ibid

[10] Anthony Zurcher, “Ukraine’s Nuclear Regret?,” BBC News (BBC, March 20, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-26676051.

[11] “Security Strategies and American World Order: Lost Power …,” accessed August 6, 2020, https://www.amazon.com/Security-Strategies-American-World-Order-ebook/dp/B001OLRON0.

[12] “Nuclear Weapons and Ukraine,” National Security Archive, January 23, 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nunn-lugar-russia-programs/2019-12-05/nuclear-weapons-ukraine.

[13] 12 ibid

[14] 12 ibid

[15] 12 ibid

[16] 11 ibid

[17] 12 ibid

[18] 12 ibid

[19] 10 ibid

[20] “Ukraine Conflict: Putin ‘Was Ready for Nuclear Alert’,” BBC News (BBC, March 15, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31899680.

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