Insider Threats and Nuclear Safety During a Pandemic – The Diplomat

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Nuclear safety is a challenge under the best of circumstances. These challenges can increase many times over in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, as the government may not fully understand the consequences and spillover effects of actions they are taking to address the pandemic on seemingly unrelated issues. For example, COVID-19 has undoubtedly created enormous economic and social pressures in many societies and is therefore likely to lead to greater psychological distress. There is no doubt that this also directly or indirectly affects the personnel in sensitive nuclear facilities and leads to potential insider threats. The Review Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in Vienna in July this year is a good opportunity to review the status of Personnel Reliability Programs (PRPs) and localize insider threats as part of a broader physical system of protective measures also.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took place in September 2020 Discussions on the effects of the pandemic on the operation of nuclear power plants, safety during operation under COVID-19 circumstances, radiation protection and emergency preparedness. These discussions took place during the annual meeting of the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG), a group of top experts from around the world who debate and advise on nuclear safety issues. The experts highlighted issues such as resilience and information sharing as key in these unprecedented times. The discussions also reaffirmed the importance of human resources, physical limitations and rules for maintaining adequate distancing and emergency preparedness. Participants also appeared to share best practices for mitigation measures through a number of steps including “quarantining new workers, temporarily halting construction at nuclear power plants, [and] work with a reduced workforce. ”

While important to the physical protection and operation of nuclear power plants, what was missed in those discussions was how some of these steps could exacerbate insider threats, another important aspect of nuclear safety. Insider threats could potentially worsen in extremely stressful conditions such as the ongoing pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated lockdowns in various countries have had an impact on macroeconomic conditions in these countries. This has led to a reduction in operations, layoffs of employees, a reduction in the presence of employees in physical premises and a certain proportion of employees who work in virtual mode. All of this can lead to possible resentment and resentment among employees and thus possibly increase the risk of insider attacks.

Why are insider threats a particular problem? Employees of nuclear power plants and power plants, as well as security personnel stationed at such locations depending on the access level, have an adequate understanding of the functioning of nuclear power plants, their safety systems and their established safety protocols, as well as any other gaps and security gaps that may exist. The authorization of these employees to traverse the various levels of the existing security systems increases the security vulnerabilities. Because insiders are known and trusted colleagues, it is almost impossible for others in an institution to spot strange or suspicious behavior. The practices associated with the institutional safety culture need to be strengthened to ensure early reporting of potential threats by insiders. Given the natural reluctance to report on friends and colleagues, especially in the midst of a job-killing pandemic, institutions need to encourage individuals to report on warning indicators.

While insider threats are rare, the consequences when they arise are severe. Almost all recent incidents of nuclear theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) have occurred with the assistance of a co-worker, or worse, the crime was committed by a co-worker. This underscores the vulnerabilities and importance of this growing threat. Such incidents happen for many reasons, including an employee’s dissatisfaction with their employer or the temptation to receive financial and other perks. Matthew Bunn and Scott Sagan write on these subjects fight This “sabotage by disgruntled employees” has long been a concern in the nuclear industry.

One of the most effective ways to review insider threats has been to conduct extensive background checks on potential employees before they are hired. These reviews are repeated periodically or when an employee is moved to a safer installation or receives a higher-security project. However, these are not foolproof measures and do not guarantee against security breaches. A more comprehensive and thorough approach – this could include ways to address a disgruntled employee, better inventory management, and stricter materials accounting processes – is needed. It should be noted that it is easier for employees to steal small amounts of materials in facilities that handle materials in powder or liquid form, as the theft of small amounts can easily go unnoticed.

While such incidents can be isolated and occur in a specific security context, the lessons and lessons learned from such incidents need to be disseminated widely. These are neither new nor specific to a country or region. Back in 1982There was an incident at the Koeberg nuclear power plant in South Africa in which “an insider placed explosives directly on the steel pressure vessel head of a nuclear reactor and then detonated it”. The incident occurred before the plant was commissioned. There are also instances of rapid political radicalization that can wipe out the best HR Reliability Programs (PRPs) designed to tackle insider threats. Take the case of Ilyass Boughalab, a safety technician who had a high safety clearance for the Belgian nuclear power plant in Doel. In late 2011 or early 2012, Boughalab was radicalized, joined the Islamic State, left for Syria and killed there. While there is little evidence that he actually attempted to use his security clearance to threaten the facility himself, it is worrying that his radicalization went undetected. Oddly enough, there was an insider attack on the Doel-4 nuclear power plant in 2014 that drained all of the lubricant from the turbine, shut down the facility for months, and caused hundreds of millions of dollars in economic damage despite the culprit not being caught and the Attack itself has not been associated with boughalab.

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Insider threats are often viewed in the context of a disgruntled employee who has an incentive to strike against their employer out of anger and resentment. While many have atomic energy managers said The fact that they “managed to work safely even during the pandemic” can never be complacent about the satisfaction of the employees. The IAEA has been proactive in this regard and has launched a COVID-19 Operational Experience Network, a pilot peer-to-peer network that will serve as a “repository for planned or implemented response measures” during the pandemic. This is a useful step, but there are no perfect or foolproof solutions to this problem. The fact that such insider threat opportunities related to the pandemic did not play a prominent role in national or international discussions should be a cause for concern. The July Review Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the CPPNM is a useful opportunity to highlight the importance of insider threats and take appropriate steps at both global and national levels.

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