Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif will play a key role in 2019 talks on whether Iran and the United States will fully rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
As the Biden government re-engages Iran and reviews US policy towards North Korea, analysts are debating whether a “transactional” approach that focuses on reducing the nuclear threat will suffice, or whether the US is a transformative “grand bargain” that is aimed at others should seek “Malicious Behaviors.” Proponents of “transactional” diplomacy argue that comprehensive agreements to transform political relations are unrealistic and that the only way to make concrete progress is to focus on the most pressing issue. The Grand Bargainers respond that any deal that is not comprehensive will meet fatal resistance from key stakeholders.
Both arguments have some value, but the perceived distinction between them is wrong: previous engagements with Iran and North Korea have been based on the hope that piecemeal transactions could provide a platform for broader diplomacy. The best progress on non-proliferation came when all sides viewed diplomatic transactions as incremental steps towards greater reconciliation.
America made its first bet that transaction non-proliferation diplomacy could pave the way for broader engagement nearly two decades ago when it signed the framework agreed with North Korea in 1994. At the time, it was clear to US diplomats that the denuclearization and transformation of the US-North Korea relationship would be a package deal, as North Korea would have no incentive to fully disarm if that relationship remained hostile. At first glance, however, the framework looks like a fundamental nuclear transaction – the North agreed to dismantle its plutonium reactors in exchange for civilian power reactors from the West. While the text of the agreement calls on both sides to “seek a full normalization of economic and political relations”, its vagueness in the implementation of that goal meant that it was essentially postponed to give concrete form to later negotiations. However, if we keep this stated political goal in mind while analyzing the physical task of building and operating large western power reactors in North Korea, it becomes clear that the political implications of these reactors would extend well beyond the nuclear realm.
With nuclear power being one of the most globalized technologies, North Korea would inevitably be included in the international networks of technical cooperation that enable the construction and operation of western power reactors. And as my research into the negotiation history of the agreed framework shows, this type of technological entanglement was exactly the point: a large civil reactor project could serve as the physical embodiment of political changes that otherwise seemed impossible. This could pave the way for more explicit policy changes in the future.
The real question, however, is whether this scheme showed any signs of functioning. Didn’t the agreed framework manage to disarm North Korea? Here, too, a more nuanced look at the historical facts tells a different story.
In terms of non-proliferation, the framework has been the most successful US policy to date to physically reduce North Korea’s nuclear capability. Most of the first civilian reactor was built in North Korea, and construction progress served as a barometer by which the North Korean regime could gauge the US’s commitment to an eventual normalization. Sure enough, when the construction of the reactors fell behind, the regime slowed its disarmament progress and hedged its bets by getting uranium centrifuges on the black market. As construction accelerated again in 1999, nuclear rollback resumed, and progress in implementation paved the way for substantial diplomatic progress on several other fronts.
When US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met Kim Jong-Il in the fall of 2000, the North Korean head of state was ready to propose a point-by-point plan to completely end North Korea’s missile program. In other words, the agreed framework made significant progress in both withdrawing the North Korean nuclear program and facilitating concessions in other areas, and the pace of that progress correlated with the adjustments and launches of the civilian reactor project. Unfortunately, the framework finally collapsed in 2002 after a new US administration hostile to the deal took office.
Does that sound familiar to you?
Today the United States is at a similar crossroads with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is based on the bet that transactional diplomacy could gradually transform Iran’s political relations with the West. The implementation of the agreement clearly reduced the risk of the Iranian nuclear program, and this success has been evidenced by a series of successive reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition to the nuclear issue, various aspects of Iran’s “malevolent behavior” appear to be correlated with US compliance with the deal. Iran’s provocations in the region, while not completely halting, were substantially reduced during the entry into force of the agreement. But when the Trump administration increasingly opposed it, Iran attacked US bases and allies in the region, showing that it can effectively sabotage Saudi Arabia’s oil production. As in the case of the agreed framework, the effective implementation of a limited nuclear agreement has implications well outside the nuclear sphere.
However, the JCPOA’s connection between transaction and transformation goes deeper than simple correlations. After four decades of economic and political alienation, sanctions and the latent proliferation of nuclear weapons have become defining elements of Iran’s relationship with the West. This alienation manifests itself physically in a lack of FDI in Iran. In sectors from oil and gas to air and ground transportation, Iranian infrastructure is characterized by a lack of Western cooperation and joint investment. Effective implementation of the JCPoA, which continues to address the nuclear issue and brings Western investment into Iranian infrastructure where it does not currently exist, could therefore change the physical structure of this political relationship. And the common interests that would be expressed in these new infrastructures could then create new incentives for both sides for further reconciliations, such as reducing Iran’s dependence on ballistic missiles.
Similar opportunities have arisen on the Korean peninsula. While Western experts focused on President Trump’s high-profile summit meeting with North Korean President Kim Jong-un, South Korean President Moon Jae-in proposed a series of development projects the implementation of which would fundamentally change North Korea’s relations with the outside world. If North Korean nuclear rollback steps were gradually coordinated with sanction waivers so that some of these projects could continue, it might be possible to slowly transform North Korea’s political relations to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons. This may have been the logic behind North Korea’s offer in 2019 to dismantle its most important nuclear facilities in exchange for partial easing of sanctions. Yet the Trump administration foolishly stuck to its all-or-nothing approach – bargain or maximum pressure. He therefore missed the unique opportunity to draft a partial non-proliferation contract that could pave the way for a more comprehensive solution.
A new administration shouldn’t make the same mistakes as Trump. It should creatively develop and faithfully implement incremental transactions that not only reduce security risks in the short term, but also pave the way for more comprehensive diplomatic solutions in the future. Transactional moves towards political transformation with Iran and North Korea will indeed be a “bet” – there is no guarantee that these more innocuous joint incentives, when created through carefully crafted transactions, will prevail. And just as with the agreed framework, the physical and financial challenges of implementing the JCPOA or a new deal with North Korea will make the path to reconciliation uneven and depend on the political will of successive presidential administrations.
However, each step along the way can reduce short-term security risks and make subsequent coordination steps more realistic. Rather than choosing between kick-the-can transactions and unrealistic transformations, the United States should begin laying the foundations for reconciliation with Iran and North Korea so that each stage of diplomacy brings us closer to more permanent solutions.
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